When a state exhibits intentionality, it involves the instantiation of an intentional property, a property of representing something. What the state represents is its intentional content. See the entries Intentionality and Mental Representation. When there is something that it is like for a subject, we can say that she instantiates a phenomenal property, or that she has a phenomenal state.
See the entry Consciousness. Phenomenal intentionality is intentionality that is constituted by phenomenal consciousness. For example, someone who accepts phenomenal intentionality might say that a perceptual intentional state representing a red cube is constituted by a reddish-cube-ish phenomenal state—the reddish-cube-ish phenomenal experience automatically and necessarily results in the representation of a red cube.
We will call intentional states that are not phenomenal intentional states non-phenomenal intentional state. PIT takes phenomenal intentionality to play a central role in accounting for intentional phenomena. The next subsections discuss ways that this initial gloss on PIT can be precisified.
A central idea common to phenomenal intentionality theories is that phenomenal intentionality plays an important role in the mind. The next subsections discuss ways that this idea can be precisified. In the same way that some physicalist theories of intentionality allow that there are merely possible forms of intentionality that are independent of physical properties, PIT can allow that there are non-actual intentional states that have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness.
Of course, more specific versions of PIT might make stronger claims. Of the three views mentioned above, Strong PIT asserts the strongest possible relationship between phenomenal intentionality and intentionality: it claims that phenomenal intentionality is the only kind of intentionality there is. Relatively few hold this view, but versions of it have been defended by Pitt , Farkas a , and Mendelovici , The difficulty with this view, as we will see below, is that it is not clear that there are enough phenomenal states or phenomenal states of the right kind to constitute all intentional states.
For example, it is not easy to see how standing beliefs like your belief that grass is green could be constituted by phenomenal states. It is compatible with the existence of non-phenomenal intentional states but claims that any such non-phenomenal intentional states are at least partly grounded in phenomenal intentional states.
There are different ways of explicating the intuitive notion of grounding used in the definition of Moderate PIT. For our purposes here, we can say that A grounds B when B obtains in virtue of A. This gloss is itself in need of further analysis, but for now it is enough to know that grounding is an asymmetric relation of metaphysical determination see Trogdon for an introduction to grounding. To say that A is partly grounded in B is to that say that A is grounded in the combination of B and other factors.
There are different views of how phenomenal intentionality might partly ground non-phenomenal intentionality: One view is that non-phenomenal intentional states are simply dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states and that these dispositions get their contents from the phenomenal intentional states that they are dispositions to bring about Searle , , , On this view, standing beliefs about grass that are not phenomenal intentional states are dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states with the same or related contents.
On this view, a standing belief that grass is green might have its content in virtue of being suitably connected to a host of phenomenal intentional states.
A third view is that non-phenomenal intentionality is a matter of ideal rational interpretation Kriegel a,b, Pautz More versions of Moderate PIT will be discussed below.
Weak PIT merely claims that there is phenomenal intentionality. It allows that there are non-phenomenal intentional states that have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness. The proponents of Weak PIT are too many to list. As we will see below, Weak PIT is entailed by some widely accepted views in philosophy of mind, including many forms of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness, the view that phenomenal states are identical to intentional states perhaps that meet certain further conditions.
Since Moderate PIT is the strongest view that is endorsed by most proponents of the general approach, it is the view that has the best claim to being the phenomenal intentionality theory.
For this reason, this article will focus mainly on Moderate PIT. On grounding views, phenomenal intentional states are grounded in phenomenal states either in individual states or in sets of such states. Since grounding is asymmetric, this view implies that phenomenal intentional states are distinct from the phenomenal states that ground them. In contrast, identity views take the relation that obtains between phenomenal intentional states and phenomenal states in virtue of which the former are constituted by the latter to be that of identity: certain instantiations of intentional properties are identical to instantiations of phenomenal properties.
On this view, phenomenal intentional states are identical to individual phenomenal states or sets of phenomenal states. Farkas a,b , Pitt though not in Pitt , and Woodward , forthcoming-a defend a grounding version of PIT. Other proponents of PIT, such as Mendelovici , favor an identity view. We can also distinguish between versions of PIT that are reductive and versions that are not. To a first approximation, a theory of intentionality is reductive if it specifies the nature of intentionality in terms that are supposed to be more basic or fundamental.
A theory that is not reductive might either be neutral on the question of reduction or incompatible with reduction. Such views entail that all intentionality is ultimately grounded in phenomenal states. Since grounding is asymmetric, the grounding phenomenal states cannot themselves be intentional and are more fundamental than intentional states.
If such views are correct, it should be possible to understand phenomenal states independently of intentionality. Versions of Moderate or Strong PIT that identify phenomenal intentional states with phenomenal states can also be nonreductive.
On such nonreductive views, phenomenal descriptions of intentional states are not more fundamental then intentional descriptions. Exactly which versions of PIT that identify phenomenal intentional states with phenomenal states are reductive or nonreductive is an open question. Regardless of whether PIT provides a reductive account of intentionality in general, versions of Moderate PIT that allow for non-phenomenal intentional states aim to reduce such states to phenomenal intentionality and other ingredients, so they provide a reductive account of at least some intentional states.
We will discuss some of these views below. For example, Loar a , who falls in the Moderate PIT camp, mostly limits phenomenal intentionality to perceptual and other sensory states. In contrast, other advocates of Moderate PIT for example, Strawson and Pitt claim that many thoughts have phenomenal intentionality. Most theorists maintain that unconscious subpersonal states, such as states in early visual processing or unconscious linguistic processing, lack phenomenal intentionality, though Bourget , forthcoming-b , Pitt , Other Internet Resources , and Mendelovici claim that some such states might have phenomenal intentionality that we are unaware of.
Phenomenal intentionality theorists also disagree on which mental states, if any, have non-phenomenal intentionality. Searle , , takes at least some standing states, such as non-occurrent beliefs and desires, to have non-phenomenal intentionality, which Strawson and Mendelovici deny. Another important question concerns the structure of phenomenal intentionality. Some proponents of phenomenal intentionality hold that it has a relational structure Pautz , ; Speaks ; Bourget forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c , while others Farkas a,b; Kriegel a,b, ; Mendelovici ; Pitt deny this.
We briefly discuss this question in Section 4. See the section Conceptual role in the entry on narrow mental content. Reductive PIT also contrasts with primitivism, the view that intentionality cannot be reduced. Reductive PIT is a competitor to tracking, conceptual role, and primitivist theories in that it is an alternative account of the grounds of intentionality.
Versions of PIT that are not reductive are also competitors to these theories, but to a more limited extent: they only offer an alternative explanation of the grounds of non-phenomenal intentional states. Such views are compatible with reducing phenomenal intentional states to tracking states and similar states. While PIT offers a different account of the grounds of intentionality than conceptual role and tracking theories, it is noteworthy that all versions of PIT are, strictly speaking, compatible with these theories.
It could turn out that PIT is true but phenomenal consciousness reduces to conceptual role or tracking, making both PIT and the tracking or conceptual role theory true. As in the case of PIT, some versions of representationalism are reductive while others are not. When one says that phenomenal states are intentional states that meet certain conditions, one might intend this as a reduction of phenomenal consciousness or one might merely intend to point out a true identity.
As in the case of PIT, many proponents of representationalism take the view to be reductive. The reductive versions of representationalism and PIT are incompatible: if consciousness reduces to intentionality, then intentionality does not reduce to consciousness, and vice-versa.
However, versions of PIT and representationalism that are not reductive are compatible. It is common for the two views to be combined: many advocates of PIT also endorse a version of representationalism, claiming that all phenomenal states are also representational states Horgan and Tienson , Graham, Horgan, and Tienson , Pautz , Mendelovici , , Bourget In the other direction, representationalism, as we are understanding the view, is committed to Weak PIT, because it entails that some intentional states are phenomenal states.
On this view, consciousness and intentionality do not bear interesting metaphysical relations to each other. For example, there is no identity or grounding relation between them separatists reject both PIT and representationalism.
Separatism is typically associated with the view that consciousness is limited to perceptual and sensory states, and intentionality is limited to beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes. This is a fairly strong version of Weak PIT. They do so by arguing for the following two principles: IOP: The intentionality of phenomenology Mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically phenomenal e.
Horgan and Tienson, POI: The phenomenology of intentionality Mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically intentional e.
Horgan and Tienson, We take IOP to say that each paradigmatic phenomenal property has an associated intentional content such that, necessarily, all instances of the property have this associated content. We take POI to say that each paradigmatic intentional property has some associated phenomenal character such that, necessarily, all instances of the property have this associated phenomenal character. Horgan and Tienson defend IOP by appealing to broadly phenomenological considerations: You might see, say, a red pen on a nearby table, and a chair with red arms and back a bit behind the table.
There is certainly something that the red you see is like to you. But the red that you see is seen, first, as a property of objects. These objects are seen as located in space relative to your center of visual awareness. And they are experienced as part of a complete three-dimensional scene—not just a pen with table and chair, but a pen, table, and chair in a room with floor, walls, ceiling, and windows.
This spatial character is built into the phenomenology of the experience. This argument echoes the transparency considerations for representationalism see the entry Representational Theories of Consciousness. We discuss these arguments in section 5. The following is a reconstruction of the key steps of their argument: The perceptual phenomenal states of a pair of phenomenal duplicates creatures that have the same phenomenal experiences throughout their existence necessarily share some contents, including many perceptual contents from IOP.
Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily have the same perceptual beliefs. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily share many of their non-perceptual beliefs. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily share many of their intentional contents at the level of perception, perceptual beliefs, and non-perceptual beliefs. Horgan and Tienson argue for the transition from 1 to 2 by articulating in some detail how the contents of perceptual experiences, either individually or in groups, bring in their train perceptual beliefs.
A key idea, supported by POI, is that perceptual beliefs and other attitudes towards perceptible contents have phenomenal characters closely associated with them. For example, there is a phenomenology of accepting various contents as true. The suggestion is that once one has a vast number of perceptual experiences with their associated perceptual contents and feelings of accepting and rejecting some of these, one qualifies as having a number of perceptual beliefs.
Regarding the transition from 2 to 3 , a key idea, again derived from POI, is that non-perceptual beliefs have extensive phenomenology. By IOP, these phenomenal characters must determine contents.
Plausibly, they determine the contents of the beliefs and desires that they characterize. So if an individual has a given belief with content C, then his or her phenomenal duplicate has this content as the content of a phenomenal experience.
Moreover, the duplicate has a feeling of accepting C. It is then quite plausible that the duplicate believes C. It could be that many intentional states are phenomenal intentional states but some intentional states are neither phenomenal intentional states nor grounded in phenomenal intentionality Bailey and Richards point out related limitations of the argument.
Mendelovici also argues for Moderate PIT on the grounds of metaphysical sufficiency: The ingredients invoked by alternative theories of intentionality, such as tracking and functional role theories, are not metaphysically sufficient for intentionality. For instance, it is unclear why having internal states playing certain functional roles should result in those internal states representing a particular content, or any content at all. Likewise, while tracking relations relate us to items that may seem to be well-suited to playing the role of content, such as objects, properties, and states of affairs, it is mysterious how tracking such items could make them psychologically relevant to us.
See also BonJour for similar worries with tracking and functional role theories. For instance, it is arguably inconceivable for there to be someone with a reddish phenomenal experience who does not thereby represent redness. If all this is right, then there is reason to think that phenomenal consciousness alone is metaphysically sufficient for intentionality, which supports Moderate PIT. We take this to mean that phenomenal states are states of things seeming a certain way, where the relevant kind of seeming is the kind we are familiar with from cases where things look a certain way in perception perhaps there are other kinds of seemings that are not phenomenal states.
For, from what we have said, 2 if it seems to you as it does for it to look this way, then, if it is also the case that there is something X-shaped in a certain position, it follows that the way it looks to you is accurate. Siewert Siewert suggests that this argument straightforwardly generalizes to a large number of perceptual experiences.
Let S be the phenomenal state in which it seems to you just as it does on a given occasion for it to look as if there is something X-shaped in a certain position. The argument in the above quotation can be broken down as follows: Necessarily, if you are in S, it looks to you as if things are a certain way W, in virtue of being in S. Necessarily, if it looks to you as if things are in way W, things being or not being W would make you accurate or inaccurate.
Therefore, if you are in S, you are assessable for accuracy with respect to things being W, in virtue of being in S. If you are assessable for accuracy in virtue of being in a certain state, this state has intentional content. Necessarily, S has intentional content. Siewert does not explicitly defend premises 1 and 2. One might object that 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. Perhaps S is such that, necessarily, things being a certain way or not would make the bearer of S accurate or not , but it is not in virtue of being in S that its bearer is assessable for accuracy.
The assessability might come from the inevitable addition of an interpretation to S in all circumstances. Siewert argues against this possibility extensively between pages and , ruling out various sources of interpretation. Gertler argues that Siewert has not ruled out this alternative, and so fails to establish PIT.
See Siewert for a response. The alternative to internalism is externalism. See the entries on narrow mental content and externalism about mental content. Loar a argues from internalism to PIT. First, Loar proposes the following two desiderata for a theory of intentionality: 1 The theory should be a non-referential theory, where a non-referential theory is a theory that does not take intentionality to be a matter of reference to external entities, for example, concrete or abstract objects.
This desideratum is motivated by internalism. Note that, for Loar, intentionality is not the same thing as reference, and so a non-referential theory of intentionality does not commit one to denying that there is such a thing as reference.
Loar then argues that internalist views that do not appeal to phenomenal consciousness fail to meet desiderata 1 and 2. The first view he considers is short-arm functionalism, the view that causal interactions between brain states give rise to intentionality.
The second view is a version of the descriptivist theory of reference combined with short-arm functionalism about its primitive representations. Having excluded these views, he argues that a version of PIT can meet his two desiderata. Phenomenal properties are inherently intentional in that they exhibit directedness, or purport to refer. Since purporting to refer is not the same thing as referring, the result is non-referential mental content. This satisfies the first desideratum. Loar argues that his view satisfies the second desideratum by arguing that phenomenal properties do not by themselves secure reference or truth-conditions.
Instead, reference and truth-conditions are a matter of externally-determined relations, as externalists such as Putnam , Burge , and Kripke claim. A brain in a vat duplicate is an exact physical duplicate of a normally embodied human brain that is kept in a vat of life-sustaining liquids and is hooked up to a computer that delivers to it the same kinds of stimulation its embodied twin receives. The brain in a vat and its twin would have matching perceptual experiences, perceptual judgments, and beliefs.
Farkas a agrees with Loar and Horgan et al. Instead, Farkas argues that internalist, phenomenally-constituted intentionality is all that a theory of intentionality needs. The argument is rather complex and open to several interpretations, but here is one simplified way of understanding it: Searle begins by noting that all intentional states have an aspectual shape, where an aspectual shape is a matter of how something is represented.
For example, there is a difference between representing Hesperus and representing Phosphorus, or representing Superman and representing Clark Kent. The differences lie not in which objects are represented, but in how they are represented—these are differences in their aspectual shapes.
Searle then argues that no internal or external unconscious physical or functional facts can determine aspectual shapes. The only thing that can determine aspectual shape is consciousness. If that is so, then it looks like unconscious states can only have their aspectual shapes in virtue of their connections to conscious states.
Searle concludes, more specifically, that unconscious intentional states involve dispositions to have conscious states, a thesis that he calls the connection principle. Sometimes he says that unconscious states are potentially accessible to consciousness, apparently meaning that they can be introspected consciously , p.
The latter is what Searle says as part of his argument for the connection principle, and this interpretation is more in line with the argument he deploys. In sum, the argument seems to go as follows: All intentional states have aspectual shape. Only states that are conscious or involve dispositions to have conscious states have aspectual shape.
Therefore, all intentional states are either conscious or involve dispositions to have conscious states. This is a version of Moderate PIT. For a response, see Searle Davies argues that Searle might be right about a kind of intentionality but that there are other kinds of intentionality invoked in cognitive science that are not dependent on consciousness.
Baaren also takes issue with the notion of aspectual shape. See also the commentaries accompanying Searle A Martian looking down on Earth with complete knowledge of all Earthly physical facts could not tell whether we are representing rabbits or undetached rabbit parts. If we do determinately represent plus and rabbits, something other than tracking relations, dispositions towards behaviors, internal functional roles, or brain states has to determine this.
Along similar lines, Strawson argues that phenomenal intentional facts about what we take an intentional state to refer to play a key role in determining what an intentional state refers to. Some argue that phenomenal consciousness is capable of explaining content determinacy. According to Graham, Horgan and Tienson, there is a phenomenal difference between representing rabbits and representing undetached-rabbit-parts.
Since PIT claims that phenomenal intentional content is determined by phenomenal character, it allows that the two states have distinct contents. The supposition that there is high-level cognitive phenomenology corresponding to such abstract contents as rabbits and undetached-rabbit-parts is key to this argument.
This is a controversial claim, but one that is quite central to many versions of PIT. We discuss this claim in section 5. Arguments for PIT from content determinacy rely on the strong claim that the totality of physical facts do not fix content determinately and that content is fixed determinately.
This claim will be resisted by anyone who thinks that physicalism about the mind is well-motivated. One might say that the intuition that physical facts cannot fix determinate contents arises from the fact that we do not have a suitably good understanding of how intentionality arises from physical facts; had we such an understanding, the intuition would disappear.
Non-relationalism about intentionality is the view that intentionality is not a relation to distinctly existing entities that serve as contents. Kriegel first argues that the following three intuitively appealing claims are inconsistent: a One can represent non-existents. Kriegel One of these claims needs to be rejected. Kriegel argues that it is c , the claim that asserts relationalism.
Kriegel considers rejecting a. On this proposal, when we seem to represent dragons, Bigfoot, or Santa Claus, we either fail to have an intentional state or we represent something else. One reason Kriegel rejects the first option is that it implies that there is a gap between trying to represent and representing, which he takes to be implausible. On the second option, when we seem to represent non-existent concrete entities, we are really just representing something else, such as existent abstract entities e.
But Kriegel takes this option to be highly counterintuitive. When we seem to be thinking about concrete flesh-and-blood Bigfoot, we are in fact thinking about an abstract or mental entity.
See, however, Mendelovici , section 9. Another worry is that accounting for the representation of non-existents seems like the wrong kind of reason to accept the existence of these abstract, mental, or merely possible entities.
Another option is to reject b. Kriegel argues that just as a monadic property cannot be instantiated without an existing particular that instantiates it, so too a relation cannot be instantiated without existing particulars that instantiate it. In short, it is a general rule that relations require relata. Rejecting b is tantamount to claiming that the intentionality relation is an exception to this general rule, which is implausible. Kriegel concludes that we should reject c.
So far, this only motivates adverbialism. The final step of the argument motivates PIT: One objection to adverbialism is that it is mysterious what non-relational intentional properties are. What is it to represent Bigfoot-wise?
Kriegel suggests that a plausible account of these properties is that they are phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties are usually taken to be non-relational and there is independent reason to think they give rise to intentionality see the other arguments in this section.
The resulting picture is one on which phenomenal intentionality is non-relational. Kriegel suggests that this view can be combined with the view that non-phenomenal intentionality is derived from phenomenal intentionality and is relational.
This argument motivates non-relational versions of PIT. However, it does not motivate relational versions of PIT, on which intentionality is relational. Loar a , Pitt , Kriegel , a , and Mendelovici , hold non-relational versions of PIT, while Pautz and Bourget forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c defend a relational version of PIT, on which both phenomenal properties and intentional properties are relational. The phenomenal features of experiences of tomatoes have the requisite structure, unlike the phenomenal features of experiences of red afterimages, but it could have been the other way around.
In "Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality", Farid Masrour seeks, like Farkas, to explain why "Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world" What does this mean? The two chapters could be fruitfully read together, and it would be an instructive exercise to compare and contrast Farkas's and Masrour's proposals. To take an example of Loar's discussed by Kroon , suppose you see apparently some indistinguishable lemons, one after the other; sometimes you actually see a lemon and sometimes you hallucinate one.
You say "That's yellow" after each apparent-lemon presentation. With respect to intentionality, your successive experiences are very different; with respect to phenomenal character, they are the same. Why doesn't this straightforwardly show that phenomenal character can't ground perceptual intentionality? Instead, he chiefly argues against the idea that in the hallucinatory case one refers to a nonexistent intentional object, as defended by Lycan and on Kroon's reading the early Husserl.
He could also have mentioned A. Kroon ends up with the view that "the narrow internal content of such apparently object-directed thoughts and experiences involve grounding presuppositions that make reflexive reference to relationships of acquaintance afforded by the experience itself" As this quotation indicates, Kroon's discussion is intricate and eludes easy summary.
Further, since beliefs are never phenomenally conscious, it is pointless to try to ground their intentionality in their phenomenology, because they have none. Perhaps their intentionality is grounded in the phenomenology of other mental states, but it is unclear how such a view could be motivated. This sounds like bad news for PIRP in particular, for Kriegel's Basicness , and indeed an opponent of phenomenal intentionality will find much ammunition in Crane's chapter.
Crane might be read as disagreeing because he holds, with Pitt et al. However, here Crane is just declaring his commitment to cognitive phenomenology, not phenomenal intentionality as Kriegel explains it.
Crane uses "phenomenal intentionality" in a very broad sense, to pick out "intentionality that relates to how things appear" In the course of his argument Crane inveighs against the widespread oxymoron of "occurrent belief"; it is alas too much to hope that this will do any good.
In "Intellectual Gestalts", Elijah Chudnoff argues for: Phenomenal Holism: PH Some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. Chudnoff writes: the upper-left-pie presenting part of our visual experience of figure D has a phenomenal character that only partial visual experiences that play similar roles in similar whole visual experiences can have -- and the same goes for the triangle-presenting part of our visual experience.
The main reason for endorsing the phenomenal holist view. The way the upper left pie in figure D looks could be harmlessly recorded by saying that it produces a "visual experience as of a partially occluded circle". This does not license talk of "experiences" as particulars, as opposed to properties or states. One might conjecture that Chudnoff is assuming that "experiences" are mental events that have experiences as proper parts, as a seminar discussion might have smaller discussions as parts, either successively or concurrently.
Further, he takes experiences and their experience-parts to be possible objects of attention -- at various points he instructs the reader to "focus on" these alleged items.
If this is indeed Chudnoff's conception of experiences, it is not explained or defended. Chudnoff then discusses a visually aided arithmetical "proof" involving arrays of dots that he takes to support PH for the special case where the "certain wholes" are what he calls "intellectual experiences". Examples of intellectual experiences are "intuiting that circles are symmetrical about their diameters" and "deciding to bike rather than walk to work" It is a short step from this, Chudnoff argues, to CP.
He spends most of his lengthy chapter attacking two theses that fall under the rubric of cognitive phenomenology, rather than phenomenal intentionality.
Pautz considers and rejects various motivations for the CP-Determination thesis, for instance that it provides the best reply to Quine and Kripkenstein. He gives a battery of arguments against CP-Determination, and then some related arguments against the CP-Existence thesis. Finally, as if this weren't enough, he develops his own "phenomenal functionalism", inspired by Lewis's functionalism, which purports to reduce the intentionality of cognitive states to that of perceptual or sensory states.
Pautz's chapter could be usefully read as a counterpoint to Pitt's and Chudnoff's. The final chapter is Charles Siewert's "Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness", which is relevant to Kriegel's fifth thesis, Subjectivity. Siewert's discussion revolves around three claims: The SRM Self-Representing Mind Thesis: Necessarily, a state c of a subject S is phenomenally conscious, only if S has the appropriate sort of mental representation of c.
CO and IC, on the other hand, are in tension, since they apparently lead to a regress: according to CO : if you have a conscious state c, then you are conscious of c. But according to IC , your state of being conscious of c will also be conscious.
And thus applying CO again one will be conscious of being conscious of c -- and so on, ad infinitum. After canvassing the suggestion that the regress can be halted or rendered harmless "by saying that the conscious state in some way refers to or represents itself" , Siewert rejects CO while retaining IC.
Siewert himself puts this differently, in terms of rival "interpretations" of CO. Siewert actually finds a grain of truth in the idea that "all consciousness is essentially consciousness of itself" , but that grain does not require "building some sort of self-consciousness into every moment of phenomenality" Siewert's explanation goes by rather too quickly in the chapter, and as Siewert says is developed more fully in his "On the Phenomenology of Introspection" in D.
Smithies and D. Stoljar eds. Although Siewert does not mention phenomenal intentionality, his discussion of the attractions of IC in effect shows why a natural thought rules it out. Recall G. There is no suggestion that a third component, for instance a "phenomenal manner of representation", is required to account for phenomenal character.
On the face of it, then, this is a version of reductive representationalism -- see the earlier discussion of Kriegel's chapter.
Intentionality, in the form of awareness, is thus a crucial ingredient in phenomenal character: the direction of explanation goes from intentionality to phenomenology, not from phenomenology to intentionality.
This is a simple yet extremely appealing idea -- it is, after all, G. And if Moore's idea is along the right lines, then a state has phenomenal character "in virtue of" its intentionality: intentionality grounds phenomenology, not vice versa. But this is to say that there is no such thing as phenomenal intentionality. The book also illustrates how the phenomenological tradition is alive and well in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.
Hahn and B. Ramberg, eds.This is a version of Moderate PIT. Few advocates of PIT seem to endorse an inflationist strategy for broad intentional states. The proponents of Weak PIT are too many to list.
Siewert's discussion revolves around three claims: The SRM Self-Representing Mind Thesis: Necessarily, a state c of a subject S is phenomenally conscious, only if S has the appropriate sort of mental representation of c. Kriegel argues that it is c , the claim that asserts relationalism. On grounding views, phenomenal intentional states are grounded in phenomenal states either in individual states or in sets of such states. Uriah Kriegel ed. The brain in a vat and its twin would have matching perceptual experiences, perceptual judgments, and beliefs.
If intentionality involves such a relation by definition, then there is no further substantive question to be asked. Loar then argues that internalist views that do not appeal to phenomenal consciousness fail to meet desiderata 1 and 2. Indeed, the true proposition seems offhand to be nothing less than the fact that Crusoe is a bachelor, and facts in general need no assistance from any operation of the mind. To a first approximation, a theory of intentionality is reductive if it specifies the nature of intentionality in terms that are supposed to be more basic or fundamental. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily have the same perceptual beliefs. To take an example of Loar's discussed by Kroon , suppose you see apparently some indistinguishable lemons, one after the other; sometimes you actually see a lemon and sometimes you hallucinate one.
He argues that since partial zombies lacking cognitive phenomenology are conceivable and phenomenally different from us, we have cognitive phenomenology.
In the case of thought, this strategy often involves arguing for rich cognitive phenomenology see section 5. Some supporters of PIT adopt an eliminativist strategy towards such unconscious states.
The options available to proponents of PIT are the same as for theories of narrow content in general. CO and IC, on the other hand, are in tension, since they apparently lead to a regress: according to CO : if you have a conscious state c, then you are conscious of c. The argument is rather complex and open to several interpretations, but here is one simplified way of understanding it: Searle begins by noting that all intentional states have an aspectual shape, where an aspectual shape is a matter of how something is represented. Pautz This line of argument combines two claims that have been defended independently. Here, we focus on the empirical challenges PIT faces in accommodating specific kinds of mental states. In sum, the argument seems to go as follows: All intentional states have aspectual shape.
Assuming that if one sees an object, then one's "perceptual experience" is "about" that object, then the issue could be illustrated with questions like: could one see a perfectly ordinary shed, even though it looks exactly like a pink elephant? Let us suppose that Alice and Twin Alice are phenomenal duplicates: they instantiate all the same phenomenal properties throughout their existences. Speaks also defends a relational view of phenomenal representation without endorsing PIT. Standing propositional attitudes do not seem to have phenomenal properties, and so, it seems their intentionality is not phenomenal intentionality.
According to Graham, Horgan and Tienson, there is a phenomenal difference between representing rabbits and representing undetached-rabbit-parts. Pautz This line of argument combines two claims that have been defended independently. Horgan a also uses epistemic indicators of phenomenal consciousness to argue for cognitive phenomenology. For example, there is a phenomenology of accepting various contents as true. Along similar lines, Strawson argues that phenomenal intentional facts about what we take an intentional state to refer to play a key role in determining what an intentional state refers to. Another kind of objection to arguments from phenomenal contrast involves agreeing that there is a phenomenal difference between the relevant cases but claiming that this difference is exhausted by sensory phenomenology, where this might include the phenomenology of perceptual imagery, affective experience, or verbal imagery see, e.
Pautz This line of argument combines two claims that have been defended independently. Mendelovici , has a largely eliminativist take on the intentionality of thought. The argument is rather complex and open to several interpretations, but here is one simplified way of understanding it: Searle begins by noting that all intentional states have an aspectual shape, where an aspectual shape is a matter of how something is represented. When a state exhibits intentionality, it involves the instantiation of an intentional property, a property of representing something. Again, the claim is that these different readings of the sentences give rise to different phenomenal experiences and that the best explanation of this is that thought has a proprietary and individuative phenomenology. One reason Kriegel rejects the first option is that it implies that there is a gap between trying to represent and representing, which he takes to be implausible.
Levine argues that Pitt fails to rule out an alternative explanation of the relevant kind of self-knowledge: immediate self-knowledge is a matter of non-inferentially coming to have an intentional state that represents that one is thinking what one is in fact thinking. Pitt considers various explanations of these abilities, and argues that the only plausible explanation is that thought has a proprietary, individuative, and constitutive phenomenology. CO and IC, on the other hand, are in tension, since they apparently lead to a regress: according to CO : if you have a conscious state c, then you are conscious of c. This argument echoes the transparency considerations for representationalism see the entry Representational Theories of Consciousness.
Siewert argues against this possibility extensively between pages and , ruling out various sources of interpretation. An ideal interpreter is a being that is perfectly rational and knows all the phenomenal and non-phenomenal but not derivatively intentional facts about the world. It is possible for thoughts to have proprietary but not individuative phenomenal characters. As this quotation indicates, Kroon's discussion is intricate and eludes easy summary. PIT takes phenomenal intentionality to play a central role in accounting for intentional phenomena. Gertler argues that Siewert has not ruled out this alternative, and so fails to establish PIT.
What is missing is the phonological form: the sound of the sought-for word. While PIT offers a different account of the grounds of intentionality than conceptual role and tracking theories, it is noteworthy that all versions of PIT are, strictly speaking, compatible with these theories. The two chapters could be fruitfully read together, and it would be an instructive exercise to compare and contrast Farkas's and Masrour's proposals. Of the three views mentioned above, Strong PIT asserts the strongest possible relationship between phenomenal intentionality and intentionality: it claims that phenomenal intentionality is the only kind of intentionality there is. The main reason for endorsing the phenomenal holist view.
Mendelovici , also endorses eliminativism but claims that she can capture many externalist intuitions through the notion of derived mental representation see the previous section. Pitt considers various explanations of these abilities, and argues that the only plausible explanation is that thought has a proprietary, individuative, and constitutive phenomenology. So consciousness also ultimately grounds belief and desire. The proponents of Weak PIT are too many to list. Versions of PIT that are not reductive are also competitors to these theories, but to a more limited extent: they only offer an alternative explanation of the grounds of non-phenomenal intentional states.